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theory *minus* the "consciously-experienced activity, which is characteristic of the whole process of attention!" Except for the postulation of the organ of apperception (and I admit that the "except" is a large one), Dr. Külpe seems in full agreement with Professor Münsterberg. (5) Pp. 462 ff. The will-process need not be conscious. There is not necessary a third, qualitatively definite element, beside sensation and feeling. The facts of will are referable partly to the laws of reproduction, partly to apperception (*i. e.*, to unconscious physiological inhibition-processes).

Plainly enough, there is a great gulf fixed between the two theories.¹ Dr. Külpe has, for purposes of psychology, sworn allegiance to the heterogenists; though he reserves the physiological ground to autogeny. Perhaps in a second edition he will clarify his views, and give up the confusing Wundtian terminology. As things are, he seems at times to recognize a consciousness which is outside of and beyond conscious content; and to be attempting to give the appearance of fullness to a capacious old bottle, with but little new wine at his command.

In other respects, the treatment of attention is as exhaustive and clear as that of any other subject discussed in the book. I do not, however, think that it is pedagogically advisable to defer the consideration of this process till the very end of a text-book on psychology. In fact, there are several alterations in the arrangement of the contents of the work which might be proposed. The greater part of I. i. 4 should, in my opinion, be relegated to II. ii. 3. Section 40 (on the simple quality of will) does not belong in its setting. A I. iii. might have been introduced, for the consideration of apperception, without begging the question of its *Gefühltheits* or of its elementariness.² To explain impulse, etc., without apperception is not good psychology.³ And minor changes might be suggested.

In estimating the work as a whole, one looks round for something to compare it with. I can find nothing but Höfding's "Outlines." There is some similarity between the two volumes. Both are published as text-books; both are compressed and matter-of-fact in style, and far from easy reading; both contain real contributions to psychology, and are not mere compilations. But there the analogy ends. Dr. Külpe's *Grundriss* stands alone as the first published complete guide to experimental psychology. And we must judge its quality to be worthy of the place in history which this fact must, of itself, assign to it.

The present review has left a vast amount of debatable matter (contained especially in the sections entitled "conditions" of such and such processes) entirely untouched. But it has already outrun its limits. It needs only to be noticed, in conclusion, that the book is well printed, on cream (not on white) paper; and that, besides the table of contents, it contains a valuable index.

E. B. TITCHENER.

Pain, Pleasure and Aesthetics. An essay concerning the Psychology of Pain and Pleasure with special reference to Aesthetics. By HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. Macmillan & Co., New York.

The new inductive psychology, which began with laboratory experiments upon the senses, reaction-times, and the psycho-

¹ For deviation from Wundt on a point of detail, which seems due to a misunderstanding of him, see p. 464.

² Which latter, however, seems granted; p. 452, § 75, 1.

³ Cf. Mind, l. c., and Külpe's own analysis, for the justification of this. He has, of course, no room for a fusion of affection with conation; cf. p. 446.

physic law, has been for a decade drifting on toward the study of the active powers of will, and there are many very recent signs that it is entering the still larger field of feeling and emotion. When it does so, it will cover the entire ground of man's psychic life. As the problems have deepened, the old materialistic bias of these studies has decreased, until there now seem promise and potency of deeper insight even into man's religious life. Mr. Marshall's book is thus most opportune, and contributes so much clearness, confusing as is his plan of arrangement, that it must be read by every one interested in the subject. He has made himself well acquainted with the vast and varied literature of the subject, save only the works of Oppenheimer — which probably appeared just too late—and of Dr. Henry Head, both of whom discuss the problem of pain in a way that is very important for his theory. Besides being severely scientific, they base their work more entirely upon anatomical and pathological data than Mr. Marshall approves.

We have read Mr. Marshall's book from cover to cover, and are much indebted to him. His fundamental position is that pleasure and pain are not the basis or raw material out of which all mental life is developed, because were this the case pleasure and pain would be used up, like raw material, in the product; and if mind was made out of them, it would show traces of their duality. Neither does he think pleasure and pain to be *sui generis* and apart, like special senses; his view is that they enter as differential qualities into all mental states, and that either of them may belong to any act or element of consciousness. If they are special qualities, they may come to all mental phenomena. Mr. Marshall's classification of instinct-feelings, of which the emotions are complexes and coordinates, is clear and convenient. Joy is a complex psychosis of coming advantage; dread, of disadvantage. Sorrow is loss of advantage; relief, of disadvantage. Over against these four passive are four active feelings—love, a complex psychosis tending to go out to beloved objects; fear, tending to flee from disadvantage; anger, to drive it away; and surprise, which is a concentration of effective action on a single object. To these last four he adds a tendency to imitate, and another to please or attract advantage. States of pleasure and pain, or algedonic states, to use the author's convenient new term, color all and do not have the wide neutral or untuned interval between them which Wundt—whom the author thinks is coming around to his general view—urges. Due scope is given to the nutritive factors which Grant Allen first brought into prominence. The description of each emotion is interesting and comprehensive. Although emotion is said not to originate in reflex or other movement or attitude, due attention is given to the latter. We could, however, but wish that so competent an author could have included the fascinating topic of sign-language, and perhaps even Delsarte, in his field of view. The object of art and pedagogy might be conceived as the enlargement of pleasure-fields—to use another happy conception of the author—and the frequency and prolongation of pleasure-states. Algedonic æsthetics are thus related to pedagogy and to ethics, and racial pleasure-getting is equivalent to racial effectiveness. This view does not favor utilitarianism nor egoistic hedonism. Even the bitterest restrictive pains should not be eliminated, for this would be death of the higher entity. The relatively permanent pleasure-field of revival is for each person the æsthetic field to which he refers in making judgments.